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BACKGROUND NOTE

Strengthening Property
Taxation Within
Developing Asia
William McCluskey, Roy Bahl, and Riël Franzsen

DISCLAIMER
This background paper was prepared for the report Asian Development Outlook 2022: Mobilizing Taxes for
Development. It is made available here to communicate the results of the underlying research work with the least
possible delay. The manuscript of this paper therefore has not been prepared in accordance with the procedures
appropriate to formally-edited texts.
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB), its Board of Governors, or the governments they represent. ADB does not
guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this document and accepts no responsibility for any consequence
of their use. The mention of specific companies or products of manufacturers does not imply that they are
endorsed or recommended by ADB in preference to others of a similar nature that are not mentioned.
Any designation of or reference to a particular territory or geographic area, or use of the term “country” in
this document, is not intended to make any judgments as to the legal or other status of any territory or area.
Boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this document do not imply any
judgment on the part of the ADB concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance
of such boundaries.

STRENGTHENING PROPERTY TAXATION WITHIN
DEVELOPING ASIA 1
William McCluskey, Roy Bahl, and Riël Franzsen 2
Introduction
Globally, there is a renewed focus among developing countries on domestic revenue mobilization as
an integral part of achieving the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. Even before the
coronavirus disease (COVID-19 pandemic, it was estimated that achieving the Sustainable
Development Goals in developing countries would require an extra 2% of gross domestic product
(GDP) from public sources (Subhanij et al. 2018: 2–5). The negative impact of the pandemic on Asian
government revenues and expenditures has further deepened the revenue shortfall.
The property tax can be of great importance in this context. If properly administered, it can be a
buoyant source of revenue and an excellent tax to support the provision of local government
services (Bahl and Bird 2018, and Bahl 2009). However, increased reliance on the property tax
involves important issues of intergovernmental fiscal design (Norregaard 2013). Interestingly, there
are indications that decentralization in itself may incentivize increased revenue mobilization from
property taxation (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2008). This supports the notion that increased
reliance on property taxation could be part of a strategy for strengthened fiscal decentralization
(Kelly 2014).
The main argument in this background paper is that the revenue potential of the property tax in
lower-income countries of Asia can only be captured if they tax “better”, i.e., if they recognize that
revenues are held back by poor valuation practices, flawed tax structures, and weak enforcement.
The only route to a sustainable and successful reform will involve addressing all of these issues with
a strategic implementation plan.
Rapid urbanization in Asia’s cities requires appropriate sources of revenue to provide the services
and infrastructure that city dwellers will demand increasingly. On the supply side, urbanization is
stimulating the growth in land values and earnings, which bodes well for revenue growth from taxes
on land and property. 3 It is common to find that the property tax has a focus on urban areas as these
are the areas of more intense development and higher land and property values. Comparative
statistical analyses show that recurrent property taxes are higher in more urbanized countries and,
within-country analyses, show that a disproportionately large share of property taxes are raised in
the larger cities (McCluskey, Bahl, and Franzsen (2022) forthcoming).
In this background paper, the focus is primarily on recurrent property taxes in the 24 members of
the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 4 each with a population of more than 2 million. Most of the
remaining members are micro or small island states and many of them do not, as yet, levy a
recurrent property tax.
1
2
3

4

This paper draws heavily from our forthcoming book, Property Tax in Asia: Policy and Practice.
The African Tax Institute, University of Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa.
On average, Asia is 50% urbanized and accounts for 54% of the world’s urban population. About 2.3 billion
people live in Asian cities (UN-Habitat 2021: 12) (Appendix).
Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, People’s Republic of China (PRC), Georgia, India,
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Viet Nam.
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Importance of Property Tax Revenue
Table 1 provides an overview of the importance of property taxes as a percentage of GDP in selected
ADB members. 5 These comparisons allow us to draw a few general conclusions.
Several countries in central Asia (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, and
Uzbekistan) have a property tax-to-GDP ratio higher than other countries in developing Asia. In part,
this could be explained by them having a system of centralized administration. Valuation is a
centralized function, while the other administrative functions are handled through a system of
decentralized tax offices (McCluskey 2016). In addition, many of these countries have invested
heavily in developing their land and property cadastres, ensuring a more comprehensive coverage of
properties.

Table 1: Recurrent Property Taxes as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product in Selected Asian
Countries
Country

Income Level

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

Low

0.12

0.12

0.00

0.00

0.00

Armenia

Upper middle

0.39

0.46

0.47

0.47

0.42

Azerbaijan

Upper middle

0.32

0.39

0.39

0.35

0.31

China, People’s
Republic of

Upper middle

0.5

0.61

0.62

0.57

0.67

Georgia

Upper middle

0.79

0.85

1.01

0.97

0.99

India

Lower middle

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.15

Indonesia

Lower middle

0.22

0.25

0.38

0.42

0.28

Kazakhstan

Upper middle

0.47

0.55

0.45

0.47

0.48

Kyrgyz Republic

Lower middle

0.55

0.53

0.52

0.49

0.49

Lao People’s
Democratic Republic

Lower middle

0.11

0.11

0.08

0.08

0.12

Mongolia

Lower middle

0.23

0.37

0.44

0.47

0.44

Myanmar

Lower middle

0.02

0.02

0.05

0.05

0.01

Nepal

Lower middle

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

Pakistan

Lower middle

n/d

n/d

n/d

n/d

0.13

Papua New Guinea

Lower middle

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.00

Philippines

Lower middle

0.04

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.35

Thailand

Upper middle

0.24

0.24

0.23

0.25

0.23

Afghanistan

5

The International Monetary Fund’s World Revenue Longitudinal database (WoRLD)provides the best
comparative fiscal data available in its compilation for 189 jurisdictions around the world. But, particularly
on matters of subnational government finance, this data bank is limited in terms of the amount of
information provided and in terms of the way in which the data are disaggregated. In particular, the data on
property taxation does not lend itself to easy comparisons across countries because of issues related to the
reporting of one-time levies on property transfers. These concerns are discussed in McCluskey, Bahl, and
Franzsen (forthcoming)
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Timor-Leste

Lower middle

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Uzbekistan

Lower middle

1.08

1.02

1.08

1.06

1.01

Viet Nam

Lower middle

n/d

n/d

n/d

n/d

0.03

0.28

0.31

0.32

0.31

0.32

Average
Japan

High

1.96

1.86

1.92

1.91

1.90

Korea, Republic of

High

0.84

0.76

0.76

0.79

0.82

Singapore

High

1.10

1.05

0.97

0.90

0.92

1.30

1.22

1.22

1.20

1.21

Average

n/d = No data.
Sources: International Monetary Fund World Revenue Longitudina, 2020; International Monetary Fund–Government
Finance Statistics, 2021; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Global (accessed 27 October 2021);
Revenue Statistics Database, 2021; and World Bank World Development Indicators, 2021 (accessed 27 October 2021).

First, little revenue is raised for the annual recurrent property tax in low-income and middle-income
countries of developing Asia. The average in the sample here is only about 0.32% of GDP, and there
are few signs that it has been growing in recent years. Compared to the averages for all taxes in
Asian countries of about 15% of GDP, it has not been a major contributor to overall revenue
mobilization. Second, it is noteworthy that the property tax ratios for three high-income countries in
Asia, namely Japan, the Republic of Korea (ROK), and Singapore, the percentages are about three
times higher than the average for the 21 low-income and middle-income countries shown in Table
1. 6 Table 2 provides a comparison of property taxes (broadly-defined) in various regions. 7

Table 2: Property Taxes as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product in Different Regions around
the World
Region (# Countries)

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

European Union (27)
Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and
Development (37)
Africa (30)

2.3

2.3

2.3

2.3

2.4

1.9

1.9

2.3

1.9

1.9

0.4

0.4

0.4

0.3

0.3

Asia and Pacific (24)
Latin America (26)

0.7
0.9

0.7
0.9

0.7
0.8

0.7
0.9

0.7
0.8

Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Global Revenue Statistics Database, 2021 (accessed 27
October 2021).

The statistics in Tables 1 and 2 raise important questions. Are Asian countries exploiting the full
potential of the recurrent property tax? What are the policy and administrative challenges that

6

7

Similarly, the high-income jurisdictions, Hong Kong, China; and Taipei,China, also raise close to 1% of GDP
from recurrent property taxes.
Broadly defined, “property taxes” include property transfer taxes, stamp duty, as well as estate and gift
taxes.
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prevent them from significantly increasing the revenue take from recurrent property taxes, and
what can they do to address these challenges? 8
Property Tax Bases in Developing Asia
A key policy issue to consider is the choice of a property tax base. Should it include land and
buildings, 9 or should it be limited to land? 10 The taxation of land and buildings dominates (Table 2
and Bahl et al. 2010; Almy 2014; Radvan et al. 2021; McCluskey, Bahl and Franzsen forthcoming)
because it provides a broader tax base and, to some, a sense of fairness. Some countries have
implemented more complex bases by using more than one recurrent tax base (People’s Republic of
China (PRC), the Philippines, and Viet Nam). In countries where a higher rate is applied to land than
buildings, the objective is to provide an incentive for property development.
The way in which the tax base is legally defined is an important policy consideration. Tax base
coverage and the way in which it is valued are equally important. When defined in this way, there is
much more diversity in the tax bases used in developing Asia (Table 3).
Some countries not wishing to use market value can apply derivatives of value commonly referred to
as cadastral value, normative value, or balance sheet value. While referred to as values, they have a
very loose connection to market value. Cadastral value and normative value are normally more
closely related to area-based approaches, given that the method of assessment is prescriptive and
formulaic. An adjusted area basis is widely used as, for example in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. A “thin” or underdeveloped real estate market
that generates insufficient transactions is often the justification for non-value-based approaches.
Table 3: Property Tax Bases and Assessment Approaches used in Asia
Tax Base

Comments

Countries

Land and buildings are valued as one distinct

Cambodia, Georgia, India
(Mumbai), Mongolia, Nepal

Separate values for land
and buildings

Common in former socialist countries, and
low-income and middle-income countries

Afghanistan, Armenia, People’s
Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia,
Kyrgyz Republic, the Philippines,
Thailand

Land only - capital valuebased

This approach only taxes the land and ignores Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon
the value of the buildings and other
Islands, Vanuatu, Viet Nam
improvements on the land. The need for
sufficient vacant land sales data are
particularly important in urban areas.

Capital value of land and
buildings (improvements)
collectively

indivisible property. Functions effectively
where there are ample open market sales
data.

These questions are addressed in McCluskey, Bahl, and Franzsen (forthcoming).
The tax base sometimes includes plant and machinery, or personal property (e.g., boats).
10 In Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu, land is the only tax base (Franzsen 2009) as is the
case in Viet Nam. In the PRC, separate taxes on land and buildings exist (McCluskey, Bahl, and Franzsen
forthcoming).
8
9
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Land only – area-based

A simple, pragmatic approach in the absence
of a land market or assessed values

PRC (land use tax); Lao People's
Democratic Republic

Buildings only

Where land is excluded for ideological,
historic, or social reasons

PRC (real estate tax)

Cadastral, normative, and Formulaic nonmarket value approaches that
balance sheet valuation
apply prescribed methods to determine the
approaches to land and/or assessment
buildings

Armenia, Kazakhstan
(nonresidential), Mongolia,
Turkmenistan (nonresidential),
Uzbekistan (nonresidential)

Rental value of land and
buildings (improvements)

This valuation approach is applied when
Bangladesh, India, Pakistan,
property leasing is the principal form of
Myanmar (urban)
tenure and there is ample rental evidence for
all types of property.

Area-based with
adjustment factors

Typically applied where no formalized real
property market exists. Market transactions
are thin across urban and rural settings.

Azerbaijan; India (Bangalore,
Delhi); Kazakhstan (residential);
Myanmar (agricultural land);
Tajikistan; Turkmenistan
(residential); Uzbekistan
(residential)

No recurrent property tax

Some of these countries have property
transfer taxes.

Cook Islands, Maldives, Marshall
Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Niue,
Palau, Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu

Note: Some cities in India use capital value, some rental value, and others adjusted area as tax base.
Source: Authors – with reference to Franzsen (2009) and Almy (2014).

Assessment of the Tax Base
The issue of property valuation is often subject to significant criticism because of its subjectivity (Bird
and Slack 2014). It is seen as the necessary condition for a revenue-productive and a fair property
tax. However, this may be an exaggerated criticism as many countries move towards more simplified
valuation/assessment approaches and away from the individual assessed value on each property.
Value banding is one approach that is gaining traction in developed (Ireland and United Kingdom are
good examples) and developing countries (Somalia) (McCluskey et al. 2002). In general, two
valuation options are typically used for property tax. The first incorporates market price-based
methods to estimate capital values or rental values (Franzsen and McCluskey 2013). The second
option is a non-value-based approach (McCluskey and Franzsen 2013) which is based principally on
the area of land and buildings, and locations.
The use of market values often faces the difficult requirement (usually a legislative one) that the
values be updated periodically. In practice, revaluations might take place every year (Hong Kong,
China; and Singapore) or every 3 years (Indonesia, the Philippines), or even longer (India).
Revaluations are politically sensitive, particularly if they coincide with national elections. They are
also expensive and can take time and effort to finish. Having a gap of several years between
revaluations often results in significant value shifts at the individual property level, and significant
tax increases. In the end, the revaluation shock may be tempered by a cap on revenue increases,
thereby giving back part of the revenue mobilization increase produced by the revaluation.
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From a valuation perspective, high-rise apartment or condominium buildings afford opportunities of
economies of scale. The properties are largely homogeneous and well suited to simplified valuation
approaches (Hong Kong, China is a good example of this).
When the land and building components are separately assessed, a commonly-used approach is to
determine the value of the buildings according to their replacement cost. The idea behind this
approach is to cost out the depreciated value of the structure that is currently on the property.
The non-value approach is typically applied in cases where property markets are not sufficiently
developed to allow determination of credible property values across all types of property. Linked to
this is are three additional factors: (i) insufficient valuation capacity within government; (ii)
incomplete registration of titles to property; and (iii) insufficient market transactions, and when they
do occur the reliability is suspect because of the under-declaration of the transfer price (UN Habitat
2011).
Under a non-value approach the most common methodology is to base the assessed value of the
property on the actual size of land and buildings (McCluskey and Franzsen 2013). Countries that use
area-based approaches, such as India and Tajikistan, often make adjustments for specific
characteristics (such as location, urban or rural zone, population of municipality, building condition,
property use, and depreciation) to proxy market value and to enhance the fairness of the tax (Rao
2008). Although revenue buoyancy is an issue, area-based assessments continue to be used
extensively in former socialist countries, notwithstanding the fact that land and buildings have
undergone privatization and property markets are rapidly developing.
Administration
The literature is extensive on the problematic issues around the administration of the property tax
(McCluskey et al. 2017; Norregaard 2013; Bahl, Martinez-Vazquez, and Youngman 2008). In fact,
administration weaknesses are not solely found in developing countries; high-income countries face
many of the same problems. For subnational governments, the management of several hundred
thousand properties liable to property tax is a real challenge. However, technology can provide
solutions to facilitate (i) property identification (using aerial imagery); (ii) billing (through better
communication, e-demand notices, email); (iii) payments (via internet banking, payments through
mobile phone platforms); (iv) valuation (by means of simplified automated approaches; and (v)
monitoring compliance (through the use of geographic information systems) (McCluskey et al. 2018).
Across the countries of developing Asia, the responsibility of administrating the property tax is
evenly split between local administration (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, the
Philippines); central administration (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz
Republic, Mongolia, Uzbekistan); and shared administration (Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Thailand,
and Viet Nam). In the context of fiscal decentralization, by far the vast majority of countries allocate
the property tax revenue to subnational governments.
Equity
An important question regarding the political acceptance of the property tax is whether it is fair and
equitable. The former is usually taken to mean whether the tax burdens fall on people according to
their ability to pay, and the latter whether similar properties pay the same property tax. In fact,
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developing countries do not often do incidence studies to test the former pattern of equity, and do
not do sales-assessment studies to test the latter. We are left to speculate about whether the
general patterns are progressive or regressive, and about sales-assessment inequities.
In theory, the distribution of property tax burdens is progressive (Bahl and Bird 2018, chapter 6).
That part of the tax on land, an immovable factor, is shifted backward to owners who tend to be in
the higher-income classes. But most property tax regimes levy against buildings as well, and that
part of the tax is split between users of the property and owners, and adds a regressive element,
depending on the mobility of capital. Moreover, countries have structured their tax rates and bases
to make the distribution of property tax burdens more progressive (e.g., graduated tax rate
structures and the exemption of lower-valued properties) or more regressive effect (e.g., the
preferential treatment of owner-occupied properties, and high threshold exemptions). On balance,
the recurrent property and land taxes are probably not regressive (Birdsall and Gupta 2018).
However, the introduction of tax features that tend to be progressive is important to make reform
results politically acceptable, and is often revenue losers.
The property transfer tax is a whole different matter. The base of the tax is either property value, or
capital gains from the sale, and the tax tends to be paid at a high rate of compliance in most
countries. It is initially borne by buyers and sellers, depending on market conditions and, on balance,
is likely progressive in its distribution of tax burdens. However, its administration is flawed by
accepting declared values of transactions, which likely reduces its progressive effects.

Efficiency
Economists and planners especially are interested in whether the property tax influences the use of
land, even to a point of recommending the introduction of special taxes on undesirable uses of land.
In theory, and in the absence of externalities, a local government tax on land is economically
efficient if it does not compromise the market allocation of resources. Since land is immobile, the tax
cannot be shifted to change the relative prices of capital and labor. Nobel laureate in economics,
William Vickery (Dye and England 2009:3), famously stated: “The property tax is, economically
speaking, a combination of one of the worst taxes — that part levied on real estate improvements …
and one of the best taxes —- the tax on land or site value.”
In fact, most economies tax land and buildings. Viet Nam taxes only land, the PRC exempts residential
buildings and Taipei,China taxes land and buildings separately. However, many countries value land
and buildings separately and by different methods (Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand). And in a
few cases (Pakistan), buildings are taxed at a higher rate than land, which is a disincentive to
development. Possibly because the effective tax rates are so low, it is not clear that the differential
taxes on land and buildings has had much effect. Another approach has been to tax vacant or
underutilized lands, but there is no evidence that these have had much success in bringing land into
development (the Philippines).
In search of revenue and political acceptability of recurrent property taxes, some countries have
added features that potentially compromise the efficiency of the property tax. These involve
fractional assessments (the Philippines) according to property use, differential tax rates applied to
certain types of property (Thailand), and outright exemptions of certain types of property from tax.
In most of developing Asia, the property tax systems are fraught with these kinds of distortions.
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Property transfer taxes are used intentionally to help correct housing boom-and-bust cycles, but
they compromise the development of property markets and cause wide swings in tax revenues.
However, property transfer taxes can be revenue productive; can influence the valuation of
property; and, even in cases where the management of these taxes is at the central or state
government level, the resulting revenues may be assigned to local governments (the Philippines).
From 2000, the PRC has been investigating the introduction of a recurrent property tax (Davis et al.
2019). One of the main objectives has been to provide local governments with a more stable and
predictable revenue stream, given the volatility of land sales. More certainty on the introduction of a
property tax has been announced in 2021 with the intention of undertaking several large city-based
pilot projects. While local government in the PRC relies on revenue from land sales, the same is also
true in Viet Nam where local government raises significant revenue from the sale of land use right
certificates (Liu forthcoming, and McCluskey and Trinh 2012).
Why are property tax revenues so low in developing Asia?
Few countries in developing Asia can trace their weak revenue performance to a single cause.
Almost always, it is because of multiple constraints, beginning with a weak economic base and a
hard-to-tax real estate sector. Beyond this, tax structures have developed in haphazard ways,
sometimes taking advantage of opportunities, sometimes cognizant of administrative feasibility, and
sometimes not, usually constrained by management problems, and always influenced by the
political economy (ADB 2020).
Some constraints are common to many (most) developing Asia countries. First, tax bases have been
narrowed by granting liberal exemptions and preferential tax treatments. These tax relief packages
are not reviewed frequently, and their revenue costs are not monitored but generally believed to
erode the tax base by a substantial amount.
Second, property valuations are often out of date because the legally prescribed revaluation cycles
are not complied with. The result has been to put off revaluations, sometimes for quite long periods.
Kelly, White, and Anand (2020) reckon that the ratio of assessed value to market value is in the
range of 30%–50% in low-income countries largely as a result of infrequent revaluations.
Third, central (and state) governments have not given adequate incentives to local governments to
make heavier use of the property tax in local budget policy. In many countries, higher level
governments have held back on giving stronger revenue raising autonomy to local governments, and
have not captured the potential benefits of fiscal decentralization. In other cases, lucrative
intergovernmental transfers have crowded out the use of local property taxation. Elected local
mayors and councils have been all too happy with these arrangements, since it frees them from
making unpopular taxing decisions. 11
Fourth, advocates of stronger property taxation have not been able to overcome the strong
opposition of powerful interest groups, voter apathy, and political rent seeking. The final results in
tax reform proposals in too many countries has been a rejection of some provisions of the new tax
proposal, or outright rejection of the reform program. Thailand and Viet Nam are recent examples.
This has led leaders in some countries to begin working on strengthening their compact with local
11 The diversity of these experiences is reviewed in Bahl and Bird 2018.
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voters in order to develop a friendlier audience for better property taxation. The contract would
involve more transparency, less inequity and favorable treatment, and better local public services.
Fifth, in most developing Asian economies, even adopted reforms have come with compromises,
e.g., effective rate roll backs in the aftermath of revaluations in Malaysia or the adoption of fractional
assessment practices in the Philippines. Legislated assessment limits on a value-based property tax
are relatively uncommon in Asia (the ROK and the Philippines). They can be used as a mechanism to
differentiate between land use types or as a way to reduce taxpayer pushbacks. However, some
successful revaluation practices in Asia (Hong Kong, China; and Singapore) have mostly avoided such
compromises, but have kept their effective property tax rates low as a matter of government policy.

Reform Policies
Is it possible to increase the revenue mobilization from property taxation as high as 1% of GDP?
Various estimates place collection rates in the range of 30%–60% (Bird and Slack 2004, and National
Institute of Urban Affairs 2010).
Add to this the shortfalls in coverage and the overgenerous package of tax preferences that have
been rolled out, it seems reasonable to conclude that a target of 1% of GDP is well within the tax
potential of many low-income and middle-income countries in Asia. How could this be achieved? By
taking a more holistic view on improving the efficiency of the current property tax administration, it
is possible to increase revenue. A key area is to improve the tax base coverage to ensure that all
properties liable to property tax are included in the valuation register or fiscal cadastre. A second
area is to improve collection by making it easier for taxpayers to pay and to incentivize taxpayers.
Third, assessed values supped should be increased to be more representative of current market
values. All of this is more difficult when countries do not use a value-based property tax. In those
cases, moving to a value-based approach would create a more buoyant base, but this comes with
significant administrative burdens that some countries are not able to manage. Last, the tax base,
tax rates should be set high enough to cover the administrative costs and to make the desired
contribution to financing public services.
To reach this higher level of revenue mobilization, governments must get the tax structure and
administration “right.” Levying higher taxes on a system is not a good strategy where the base has
been significantly eroded by exemptions and preferential tax treatments, where properties are
significantly undervalued, and where collection rates are low. This would only worsen the distortions
already present in the system and erode confidence in the property tax on the part of those who
presently comply. McCluskey, Bahl, and Franzsen (forthcoming) argue that countries must make
their property tax “better” before they can increase revenues from it.
Below are some general ideas that might be part of the property tax strategy of developing
countries in Asia.
(i)
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Reforms should be comprehensive rather than piecemeal. It is not possible to
effectively change any one of property base coverage, tax rates, assessment, or
collections without taking account of the other legs in the system. The lesson here is
that property tax reform programs are not quick fixes, like an increase in the income
tax, but involve serious analysis to develop the reform architecture and necessary
administrative changes.

A good example of a major property tax reform project was undertaken in Punjab,
Pakistan. The modernization of the urban immoveable property tax involved
improving the administration which suffered from outdated manual processes,
paper-based records, poor collection, and low tax base coverage. The project began
in 2014 (largely completed in 2016) with the development of a geographic
information system-based administration platform that utilized satellite imagery
along with a mass property data collection. The digitization of records, automation
of systems, and field surveys to validate records added more than half a million new
taxable units to the tax base. Property tax collections also improved. Pre-project, the
average annual increase was some 5% (in nominal terms) reaching 6% during the
project years (McCluskey 2020).
(ii)

Lower-income countries struggle with having to do individual property valuation, yet
to make property tax reform work, property valuations need to be raised to market
value levels and revaluations need to be regular. Possible solutions are, a simplified
value-based banded system (Somalia), or one that uses objective assessment
adjustments (Sierra Leone), or alternatively the use of value zones (the Philippines,
the ROK) have shown merit, but they have not graduated property tax revenues to
sufficiently high levels.
Property tax reforms recently undertaken in Freetown, Sierra Leone demonstrate
that moving from a value-based system (rental value) to one based on the size of the
building, location, condition and actual use resulted in improved revenue
performance (Grieco et al. 2020).

(iii)

Often, a key structural problem is the lack of buoyancy in the revenue from the land
and property tax. International norms would dictate that the revenue from property
tax should at least keep pace with inflation and be correlated with rising expenditure
costs facing local government. Low revenue buoyancy is related to assessments that
are fixed for several years, and tax exemptions and preferential assessments that
are too large.

(iv)

The property transfer tax system needs to be based on assessed market value rather
than declared values. This might be accomplished (overtime) by monitoring
declarations and imposing penalties on detected under-declarations. Another result
of such a reform could be better information to support assessment practices for
the recurrent property tax.

(v)

All exemptions and other preferential tax treatments should be regularly reviewed
and graded, and their revenue cost assessed. All future exemptions should face
provision for re-voting to extend their tenure. The property tax base is eroded in
some jurisdictions because of explicit policy decisions to limit the use of property
taxes by governments through exemptions, tax and expenditure limits, tax
incentives (to attract business), and other preferential treatments. Narrowing the
property tax base means that tax rates have to be higher to collect the same amount
of revenue, but this increases the excess burden of the property tax and harms the
efficiency of the system.
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(vi)

In many countries the property tax is too complicated. At least in the short run,
valuation approaches should be aligned to the capacity of the department that
undertakes the valuations and the type and quality of available data.

(vii)

Enforcement is lax in many Asian countries, as evidenced by low collection rates and
large arrears. The laws should be applied to delinquents, and penalties should be
assessed.

(viii)

Governments should be more transparent in reporting the outcomes of their
property tax system to taxpayers.

Levers for Unlocking the Revenue Potential of the Property Tax
Maximizing the revenue potential of the property tax involves many moving parts. Table 4
illuminates the levers that, through improved administration and appropriate tax policy, could result
in increased revenues. Some of these levers are administrative actions, for example, appropriate
billing, and developing easy payment options. Others might rest with a higher level of government,
e.g., technology where efficiencies can result in positive revenue gains but where the potential cost
for a local government to develop or procure the systems may be prohibitive.

Table 4: Levers to Improve Property Tax Revenue
Revenue impact

Administrative
Feasibility

Politically
Acceptable

Legislatively
Possible

Policy levers
Basis of the tax

This can be
significant

Challenges in
determining the value
for each property

Could be an issue if
this results in
significant shifts in
tax liability

Would require
legislative support

Tax rates

Potentially
significant

Avoid too many
different rates; correct
distortions in the base
before increasing tax
rates

Problematic and
sensitive issues in
terms of liability

Legislation may
need to be
amended

Exemptions and reliefs

Potentially
significant

Not normally an issue

Politically sensitive

Legislation may
need to be
amended

Comprehensive tax base

Significant because
there is a broader
tax base.

If resources are weak,
this could be a
significant challenge.

Including all areas
within the tax net
can be met with
resistance.

Laws may need to
be changed to
ensure that all
properties are
included.

Having up-to-date
property values

Having current
values improves
fairness, and could
have a significant
revenue impact.

Represents a major
challenge because of
the lack of resources
and cost implications

Can be extremely
unpopular

Legislation may
specify the
frequency of
updating values or
it may be silent.

Administrative Levers
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Efficient billing

Low

Often an issue because
of the number of bills to
be distributed.

Normally not an
issue

Normally not an
issue

Simple payment
modalities

Significant as it
facilitates easier
payment.

Requires agreement
with banking and
mobile phone sectors

Normally not an
issue

Normally not an
issue

Effective enforcement

Potentially
significant to
ensure that arrears
plus fines are
collected.

Problematic where
recourse is primarily
through the courts.

Can be an issue
where there is
reluctance to
enforce against
vested interests

Laws typically
provide for
enforcement
measures.

Technology

Can be significant
because of
efficiency gains

Cost and capacity to
implement may be
issues

Normally not an
issue

Normally not an
issue

Source: Authors’ compilation.

Conclusions
Property tax reforms should be rooted in a sound policy framework, and must be executed through
well-drafted laws. This applies to all essential features: property identification, tax base selection,
valuation, assessment, tax rate determination, billing, collection, enforcement, as well as overall
system management. These functions are often performed by different entities or agencies implying
a need for collaboration, coordination, and cooperation. If done well, digital solutions such as aerial
imagery and the use of information technology can improve efficiency, reduce administrative and
compliance costs, and, importantly, also improve taxpayer trust and confidence (McCluskey et al.
2018).
Property tax reform strategies within the context of political and fiscal decentralization goals must
consider local context, including diverging political interests at central and subnational government
levels. The sharing of data between institutions is becoming a central theme in supporting the
property tax. Moving data from analogue to digital makes for easier sharing, but still being cognizant
of the need for confidentiality. Keeping all role players well informed and properly sequencing
reform initiatives are crucial.
The watchword for property tax reform in developing Asia should be that countries have to tax
better before they can tax more (McCluskey, Bahl, and Franzsen forthcoming).
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APPENDIX: URBAN POPULATION IN ASIA
Urban Population
as a % Total
Populationa (2020)

Population in
Largest City as % of
Urban Populationb
(2020)

Population in
Largest City as % of
Total Population
(2020)

Average
Annual
ncrease in
Urban
Popilationc
(2015–2020)

38.93

26

42

11

3.37

2.96

63

58

37

0.22

Azerbaijan

10.11

56

41

23

1.58

Bangladesh

164.69

38

33

13

3.17

Cambodia

16.72

24

51

12

3.25

1,402.11

61

3

2

2.42

3.71

59

49

29

0.42

1,380.00

35

6

2

2.37

Indonesia

273.52

57

7

4

2.27

Kazakhstan

18.75

58

18

2

1.29

Kyrgyz Republic

6.59

37

43

16

2.03

Lao People’s
Democratic Republic

7.28

36

26

9

3.28

Mongolia

3.28

69

70

48

1.63

Myanmar

54.41

31

31

10

1.74

Nepal

29.14

21

24

5

3.15

220.89

37

20

7

2.53

8.95

13

32

4

2.51

109.58

47

27

13

1.99

Tajikistan

9.54

28

35

10

2.62

Thailand

69.80

51

29

15

1.73

Timor-Leste

1.32

31

n/d

n/d

3.35

Turkmenistan

6.03

53

27

14

2.46

Uzbekistan

34.23

50

15

8

1.28

Viet Nam

97.34

37

24

9

2.98

Country

Afghanistan
Armenia

China, People’s
Republic of
Georgia
India

Pakistan
Papua New Guinea
Philippines

2020
Population
(million)

n/d = No data.
a

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?view=chart (accessed 27 October 2021).

b

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.URB.LCTY.UR.ZS?view=chart (accessed 27 October 2021).
https://unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2020/10/wcr_2020_report.pdf (accessed 27 October 2021).

c

Sources: World Bank (2021; 2020) and UN-Habitat (2020).
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